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Calibrating, Counting, Grounding, GroupingJennifer Elgot-Drapkin1Diana Gordon2Sarit Kraus3Michael Miller4Madhura Nirkhe4Donald Perlis41Arizona State University2Naval Research Laboratory3Bar Ilan University4University of Maryland1 IntroductionEven an \elementary" intelligence for control of the physical world will require very many kinds ofknowledge and ability. Among these are ones related to perception, action, and reasoning about\near space": that region comprising one's body and the portion of space within reach of one'seectors; chief among these are individuation and categorization of objects. These in turn aremade useful in part by the additional capacities to estimate category size, change one's beliefsabout categories, and form new categories or revise old categories.In this position paper we point out some issues in knowledge representation that can arise withrespect to the above capacities, and suggest that the framework of \active logics" (see below) maybe marshaled toward solutions. We will conduct our discussion in terms of learning to understandin a semantically explicit way one's own sensori-motor system and its interactions with near-spaceobjects.Implicit in successful grouping (categorizing) of near-space objects are individuating (grounding,numbering, and binding) them and also calibrating one's sensori-motor system. A glossary belowoers brief descriptions of some of these terms.2 Motivational examplesSome instructive settings to keep in mind are:Address correspondence to:Donald PerlisComputer Science DepartmentUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742(301) 405-2685perlis@cs.umd.edu 2
1. An infant whose near space is its crib: as its sensory-motor system develops, internal mapsmust be recalibrated again and again, so that \hand-eye" coordination can continue to developas well.2. An adult tted with a new glasses prescription: the ground looks nearer or farther thanbefore, and allowance must be made for this, until internal maps reorganize.3. A robot whose arm has been replaced by a longer one, or whose lenses have become cloudedor displaced: the same issues as above.4. A mobile robot accustomed to horizontal ground, but now on sloped ground: more or lessmotor activity is required now, depending on direction of motion.These settings all involve learning (or relearning) appropriate relations between sensory andmotor modalities, where \appropriateness" is judged by results in terms of successful negotiationwith objects in near space. Such negotiation includes individuating objects as objects (and distin-guishing one object from another), binding object-identication over time as an object is seen indierent contexts, manipulating or tracking objects (esp. with regard to sensory-motor miscalibra-tion), semantically grounding internal syntactic expressions in terms of perceptual acts, categorizingobjects into natural groups (by type, position, etc.) and noting multiple instances of objects of thesame type (counting).Our long-range goal is the design and implementation of a robotic agent has explicit semanticaccess to these evolving changes in its beliefs, so that it can communicate with others, and inparticular can explain mistakes it made based on poor alignment of internal model. This will beimportant both to help it avoid future mistakes (or recalibrate more quickly) and to warn othersto watch for similar problems.Specic capabilities we wish to build into an articial agent in the next few years are:1. calibrate its internal self-model as needed to allow appropriate interaction with near space,and recalibrate in the face of changes in its perceptual or motor systems2. perceptually pick out objects in its near space3. properly individuate, count, and keep track of those objects in an internal language4. classify those objects into appropriate categories5. reason about those categories, e.g., count or estimate sizes, form and apply defaults, etc.6. revise categories and category membership as needed3 DiscussionSome of our previous work [3, 2, 6, 10, 8, 14, 11] treated rather disjointed aspects of this long-range problem. In this position paper we simply single out four key aspects of the more integrativelong-range task: calibration, counting, grounding, and grouping.Some aspects of the larger task are not ones we intend to address, especially those bearingmost directly on basic perceptual or motor skills (vision and robotics). We also are not explicitlyconcerned with qualitative physics in the usual sense [16], but rather principally with an agent's3
self-models as they incorporate information about dealing with near space. Self-models and nearspace are what we are now beginning to focus on in some of our current research.We have selected reasoning about near space because we think categorizing is both easier andmore important there than in far space. Certainly infants and simple organisms deal primarily withnear space; and imminent threats to survival tend to be in near space even for complex agents. It isplausible that most of our mental machinery has evolved in ways that are facilitative of near-spacereasoning.Calibration and grounding are inherently agent-oriented, whereas counting and grouping areless obviously so. Calibration and grounding refer to the agent's ability to coordinate perceptionand motion and (in our view) explicit beliefs about the agent's body in relation to near space.Some related work by others on calibration, grounding, and self-models includes [1, 9, 15, 5, 7].Confusion and contradiction can easily arise in near-space (due to noisy or conicting data frommultiple modalities, or from defaults gone wrong), and the recognizing of such is a crucial stepin setting one's world view right again; this is where symbolically explicit calibration can enterimportantly.Counting and grouping are more general tasks, but again in our view they can (and should) beseen as extensions of basic measurements the agent can carry out based on fundamental notions ofits own bodily measurements, in an internal self-model. (This also bears on the so-called active-vision paradigm, which maintains that the intentions and actions of the seeing agent are critical toits visual computations.)It is of interest that although categorization (grouping) has received a great deal of attentionby psychologists [4], little study has been made on the human use of categories to advance defaultinferences. Thus much is known about how humans come to classify something as a bird (e.g.,by comparison with a prototype feathered creature), but not much about how humans then drawfurther inferences about that object (e.g., that it can y). On the other hand, in AI much attentionhas been given to the latter, but less to the former. We wish to bring these two areas closer together,using active logics as a formal tool in which change of belief over time can be modeled. We believetheir combination to be fundamental to intelligent near-space behavior.In each of our four key capabilities, learning must take place in order for appropriate behavior tobe possible: the agent must learn a new relation between its body (sensors or eectors or both) andits near space, along with individuation of objects and their categories and quantities. While suchlearning is possible without explicit symbolic representation (indeed probably is most commonlyso), there is added benet to having some explicit knowledge and even meta-knowledge of theprocess of learning. We gave some benets above. Another is that an agent who is aware of thediscrepancy between its current sensory-motor behavior and its desired behavior (e.g., in reachingfor objects but missing them) may take more care during the learning period, so as to make fewer(or less drastic) mistakes until automatization occurs.The portion of the meta-reasoning that we have been working on to date includes representa-tional tools for change in belief and for recovery from contradictory beliefs. Others to be workedon include change in category; magnitudes (cardinal and ordinal counting and measurement); sets[13, 12] (as convenient representations for both categories and counting); and rule-learning (autom-atization of explicit beliefs about actions).Category discrimination in itself may be largely perceptual and is not the direct focus of our con-cern here. Rather, our topic is the reasoning about categories that one can discriminate. There areseveral issues in knowledge representation that arise here, that appear not to have been addressed inexisting work. Chief among these is counting: simple arithmetical skills such as comparing relativesizes of two categories, or noting that a category has exactly three members, all of which share a4
salient property, are taken for granted in human behavior, and are extremely useful. Yet they aregenerally left out of computational models. Closely related to \numerosity" is change of belief, forthe process of size-estimation leads to new information about categories, that may require revisingof previous beliefs. Size-estimation in turn we will relate to bodily measurements, alluded to above;preliminary work on this is found in [14, 11].4 Active LogicsOur perspective is that active logics may provide a useful (even crucial) tool for addressing theissues of calibrating, counting, grounding, and grouping of near-space objects and actions in asemantically explicit way. The principal reason for our view is that all four of these capacitiesare ones where error and belief-revision will be common occurrences. Active logics were developedlargely to deal with just such matters, with special meta-inference rules to recognize and containerrors. This is one form of self-modeling, and is related in a general way to the above commentsabout measurement as well.In 1986 we coined the term \step logics" for a new kind of time-situated reasoning, in which thepassage of time during reasoning is itself encoded in the syntax of the logic, via special time-sensitiveinference rules. These were used to provide time-situated solutions to a number of problems incommonsense reasoning, including default reasoning, reasoning about others' beliefs, planning withdeadlines, and recognizing and correcting errors (including contradictory beliefs). More recently,we have adopted the term \active logics" as both more descriptive and also more general, to allowlearning of new syntactic expressions (lexicon growth) and altering of semantic content of existingexpressions (semantic shift), in addition to the features of step logics.An active logic is both an abstract rule system and an inference engine that produces theorems(beliefs) using those rules. Their single most unusual feature is a special rule for the predicateNow(t) whose intended meaning is \the time is now t". As the logic produces theorems over time,a sequence of ws of the form Now(t) become briey believed and then replaced by the next in thesequence: Now(0); Now(1); Now(2); : : : so that the argument t to the currently-believed Now(t)is a dynamic measure of the actual (changing) time as the logic draws inferences. In eect an activelogic has a wristwatch that it checks to update its belief as to what time it is, in parallel with itsother reasoning.This \wristwatch" is the key to most of the special capacities of active logics, and we have usedit extensively in addressing the problems listed two paragraphs above. In particular, it facilitatesa powerful and computationally tractable kind of meta-inference. It is our hope that we will haveequal success in nding semantically explicit solutions to the problems of calibrating, counting,grounding, and grouping, for all of these are ones where error and revision of beliefs will be frequent.5 GlossaryCalibration: setting up appropriate internal maps to put sensory modalities in correspondencewith one another and with motor systems, to allow coordinated sensori-motor behavior. Such mapsneed to be adjusted, during growth and other times of physical change.Individuation: picking out aspects of perceptual space as being (or representing) real individualobjects; thus two red balls are individuated as two objects, not one. Related to counting.5
Grounding: tying internal symbols to the external entities they represent; that is, providing themeans by which internal symbols can represent specic external entities. Related to counting: oneobject-symbol should not be grounded in two di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